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Abstract  
This paper proposes a specific mechanism to explain differences in political institutions based on the 
asymmetric and uncertain costs of civil conflicts. Asymmetry implies that the net benefit of fighting an 
insurgency is not shared equally by members of the elite. But uncertainty implies that these benefits are more 
evenly distributed ex-ante. The members of the elite face a commitment problem: they would like to commit 
in advance to a strong response to insurgencies, but ex-post they have the incentives to block any response if 
the conflict mainly affects other members of the elite. One way of solving this is empowering the executive so 
he may react forcefully to conflicts, despite the opposition of some fraction of the elite. In the model this 
group has to decide on the constraints imposed on the executive. Fewer constraints lead to a higher risk of 
expropriation. But more constraints lead to a suboptimal response to conflicts. The main prediction is that, 
conditional on asymmetric and uncertain costs, the higher is the likelihood of a civil conflict in the future, the 
lower are the constraints imposed on the executive. The paper empirically validates this implication using two 
types of evidence. First, it uses a sample of former colonies that became independent after WWII and 
geographic variables to identify the exogenous component of the likelihood of civil conflicts at the moment of 
the independence. Second, the model is used to explain the political events in the Americas after 
independence. Countries less prone to internal conflicts were the ones that imposed more constraints on the 
executive during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo propone un mecanismo específico para explicar diferencias en instituciones políticas basado en la 
asimetría e incertidumbre que poseen los costos de ciertos conflictos civiles. La asimetría implica que el 
beneficio neto de pelear contra una insurgencia nos es compartido de forma similar entre los miembros de la 
clase gobernante o elite. Pero la incertidumbre implica que estos beneficios están mejor distribuidos con 
anterioridad a que se produzca un conflicto. Debido a esto a los miembros de la elite les gustaría 
comprometerse a una respuesta fuerte a cualquier insurgencia en el futuro, pero luego que ésta ocurre tienen 
el incentivo a bloquear una respuesta fuerte si ellos no son afectados de forma importante. Una manera de 
solucionar este problema es empoderando al ejecutivo para que éste pueda reaccionar de manera más fuerte 
ante un eventual conflicto, no obstante la oposición de una fracción de la elite. En el modelo este grupo debe 
decidir en las restricciones que se imponen al ejecutivo. Menores restricciones llevan a un riesgo de 
expropiación mayor, pero mayores restricciones llevan a una respuesta débil a conflictos civiles. La principal 
predicción del modelo es que, condicionando en costos asimétricos e inciertos, mientras mayor es la 
probabilidad de un conflicto civil en el futuro, menores son las restricciones impuestas al ejecutivo. El trabajo 
valida empíricamente esta predicción utilizando primero un grupo de países que lograron su independencia 
luego de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y variables geográficas para capturar el componente exógeno del riesgo 
de conflicto futuro y los países de América luego de la independencia. Se muestra que en ambos casos países 
que estaban más sujetos al riesgo de conflicto interno impusieron menos restricciones a sus ejecutivos luego 
de su independencia.  
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There is an extensive empirical literature that identiﬁes political institutions as one of the main
determinants of income per capita today. Eﬃcient political institutions ensure that the government
(or elite) is suﬃciently constrained so it cannot engage in coercion and expropriation. Thus,
adequate constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives are associated with political
institutions conductive to long-run economic growth. These ﬁndings have spawned a research
agenda that tries to understand the determinants of institutional quality. In this context, conﬂict
has received growing attention in explaining how societies are organized. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2006) identify the fear of revolutions as the key factor behind the extension of franchise
to a larger fraction of the population, Glasser and Schleifer (2002) argue that coercion through
violence may explain diﬀerences in judicial independence, and Besley and Persson (2010) show that
a higher probability of conﬂict reduces the incentives to invest in both ﬁscal and legal capacity.
This paper proposes a speciﬁc mechanism to explain diﬀerences in political institutions based on a
particular feature of civil conﬂicts that has not been explored before. We develop a simple model
of institutional building to study how intra-elite power is allocated under the risk of rebellions,
and test its main prediction using diﬀerent strategies to identify the risk of internal conﬂicts for
diﬀerent groups of countries.
In the model there is an elite that faces the risk of uprisings by external groups. If the beneﬁt
of ﬁghting an insurgency is not internalized equally by the elite’s members, due for instance to
regional interests, there is disagreement in terms of the size of an eventual response. But if there is
uncertainty about who will be aﬀected by future uprisings, disagreement is lower ex-ante because the
expected beneﬁts of ﬁghting are shared more evenly among members of the elite. Thus, conﬂicts
generate a commitment problem. Elite members would like to commit in advance to a larger
military response to conﬂicts than the one they are willing to sustain once a conﬂict has erupted
in some region. Institutional building is characterized in the model as a stage in which the elite
restricts policy-making in the future, imposing constraints on the executive’s decisions. There is a
trade-oﬀ at this point: more constraints lead to lower expropriation or a larger provision of public
goods in the future, but they also lead to an ex-ante suboptimal response to conﬂicts1.S i n c et h e
executive can ﬁnance war without taxing his own district, and because members of the elite not
aﬀected directly by the conﬂict are likely worse oﬀ from ﬁnancing the military response, the lower
are the constraints facing the executive, the larger is the military response. The main implication
of the model follows; under asymmetric and uncertain costs, a higher likelihood of a civil conﬂict
in the future incites the elite to impose fewer constraints on the executive, even though that is not
conducive to long run economic growth2.
1Intra-elite conﬂicts are not analyzed in the model. However one could think that an additional beneﬁt of having
more constraints on the executive is to reduce the risk of this type of conﬂict.
2This assumes some additional institutional constraints, particularly the lack of private insurance and the impos-
1The model shows that two features of conﬂicts are necessary to generate this prediction, their
costs should be asymmetric and uncertain. It follows that external conﬂicts and revolutions, which
aﬀect the elite as a whole, would not generate the aforementioned eﬀect on political institutions3.
The literature that studies modern civil wars has shown that most of them are ethnic, geograph-
ical, and religious in nature, while class struggle is relatively rare (Ray, 2010). In particular, one
of the strongest relationships that the empirical literature has found is between civil conﬂicts and
geographic conditions, particularly the abundance of mountains and forests (Fearon and Laitin,
2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). This illustrates the fact that most of
these conﬂicts are, at least in the beginning, localized in speciﬁc regions, and therefore they partic-
ularly aﬀect members of the elite with economic interests in those regions. Thus, the assumption of
asymmetric costs seems justiﬁed. With respect to the second condition there are reasons to expect
that the distribution of the costs of modern civil wars is uncertain, mainly because geography may
generate conﬂicts where there are no apparent reasons for it (Kalyvas, 2007). Thus the theory
may be applied to most modern civil wars, which have been the focus of recent economic research
surveyed by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2010).
This paper uses a sample of more than 80 countries, mostly from Africa, Asia, and Eastern
Europe, that became independent after WWII to show that a higher likelihood of a civil war in
the future lowers the average constraints imposed on the executive during the ﬁrst years after
independence4. To identify causality geographic variables are used as instruments to capture the
exogenous component of the likelihood of a civil conﬂict in the future. This is consistent with the
theoretical model and follows previous empirical work on the causes of civil wars. Additionally it
is shown that (1) the magnitude of the eﬀect is larger when only minor conﬂicts are considered,
and (2) the eﬀect is signiﬁcant only in countries without oil ﬁelds. These results are in line with
the theoretical prediction, since the costs of internal conﬂicts are more likely to be asymmetric and
uncertain when the conﬂicts are small and when natural resources are not abundant in the country.
A diﬀerent environment to which the model can be applied is the post-independence period
in the Americas. In this case historians have identiﬁed the possibility of uprisings by natives
and slaves as an important risk for the elites (Coatsworth, 1988; Eakin, 2007; Williamson, 2009).
Rebellions were costly, localized in certain regions but widespread, and, with very few exceptions,
far from seizing power. The elite was geographically dispersed, since these were mainly agrarian
and mining economies. These features closely approximate those required by the model’s main
mechanism. As an additional test the paper studies if the model is able to explain the political
sibility to separate military and economic decisions between the executive and the rest of the elite.
3Indeed, models focusing on the elite’s fear of revolutions have the opposite prediction (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000, 2006). Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) is an exception since under certain conditions a threat of revolution
may facilitate a reduction of the coalition needed to support the executive.
4The explanatory variable is constraints on the executive, from the Polity IV database, which refers to the
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives imposed by any accountability group
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2007).
2events in the Americas after independence. The econometric evidence shows that the fear of race
wars aﬀected the design of political institutions during the nineteenth century as predicted by
the model. In particular countries prone to this type of conﬂict, proxied by the fraction of the
population comprised of natives and slaves, were the ones that imposed fewer constraints on the
executive after independence. Moreover we show that this was particularly the case in countries
with geographic conditions preventing an eﬃcient reaction to uprisings by the government.
In this dimension this paper belongs to the literature on the colonial origins of development
(Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002). The common theme is that
the exploitation of natives by Europeans generated deep inequalities and extractive institutions
that were not designed to enforce property rights. However, this paper deals with institutions
regulating the relationship among members of the elite, and not between the elite and the rest of
the population. In this context this paper stresses that the exploitation of the population in the
colonies not only generated a concentration of political power within societies, but also within the
group holding the political power. This may have had dynamic consequences, such as reducing
the political power of new members of the elite that appeared when economies started to diversify,
whose interests were closer to democracy and long-run economic growth, or raising the stakes of
politics, hindering the evolution of democratic institutions5.
Perhaps the most notable historical example to illustrate the model’s prediction is the US
Constitution, a case in which the debates and ideas that shaped it have been well documented. The
previous political order, deﬁned by the Articles of Confederation, was based on the individual liberty
philosophy observed by the Revolutionary movement. Political power was concentrated in the
states, leaving the national government unable to implement most policies. In particular Congress
did not have power to suppress domestic insurrections (Maier, 2010). Although the convention in
Philadelphia in 1787 was intended to ﬁx other problems of the Articles of Confederation, Thach
(1969), who studies the political environment before the convention, concludes that its outcome was
importantly inﬂuenced by rebellions and the diﬀerent experience of the states regarding executive
power. With respect to the ﬁrst issue, he argues that “the most important inﬂuence convincing
the gentry that [national] government strength ... was desirable, was the rising discontent of the
poorer classes which ... precipitated disturbances such as those in Connecticut, New Hampshire
and, specially, Massachusetts [Shay’s Rebellion]”6. Rebellions also inﬂuenced the second issue, as
New York, the state with the strongest executive, stood out as the only one able to sustain a strong
reaction to them7. Therefore many delegates to the convention, inﬂuenced by Shay’s Rebellion or
5Garc´ ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2011) identify a particular channel. They show that the presence of a frontier in the
Americas after independence aﬀected long-run development conditional on how constrained the executive was at the
time of national expansion. Diﬀerences in political institutions resulted in diﬀerent paths, ranging from clientelistic
to open access to frontier lands.
6The Shay’s rebellion was defeated by an army ﬁnanced voluntarily by wealthy Bostonians, as the states seemed
powerless against upheavals (Maier, 2010).
7Thach (1969) argues that “the experience of the states taught ... the futility of legislative military control. Most
3the experience of the states, wanted a strong national executive (Horowitz, 2002). Thach (1969)
illustrates the trade-oﬀ facing the elite: “As men’s thoughts turned towards the establishment of
public order and ceased to focus on individual liberty, it was inevitable that the executive department
should be the chief beneﬁciary of the change in emphasis”.M e m b e r so ft h ee l i t ew e r ea w a r eo ft h e
costs of empowering the national executive. Besides their experience with the British government,
they also saw how the control of patronage by the governor of New York allowed him to become
the dominant political force in the state8.
The theoretical model is based on the work by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), who highlight the
trade-oﬀ between delay and the arbitrariness of policy decisions when analyzing diﬀerent formal
rules regarding the way legislatures bargain. More generally this paper belongs to the literature on
conﬂict and institutional development, where, in addition to the work by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2006), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), Glasser and Schleifer (2002), and Besley and
Persson (2010), a fundamental relationship between intra-elite violence and social orders (North
et al., 2009), and between war and state development (Tilly, 1992), have been previously proposed9.
As mentioned already, because of its empirical applications the paper also belongs to the liter-
ature on the colonial origins of development (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997, 2002; Acemoglu et al.,
2001, 2002). Nunn (2008), in an empirical study for the Americas, ﬁnds a signiﬁcant relationship
between slavery and subsequent economic development, even across the British West Indies and
across US states. But he does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that this relationship has been explained
by the eﬀect of slavery on inequality, as argued by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002). Indeed
his results are consistent with the role of institutions as the mechanism through which slavery
aﬀected development in the region, in line with the predictions of our model10.D u e t o o u r e m -
pirical work we also refer intensively in the paper to the empirical literature on civil wars and the
post-independence period in the Americas.
states included almost every conceivable provision for reducing the executive to a position of complete subordination,
being New York the most notable exception, where the strong reaction against insurrections and the opposition to
a legislature that threatened to surrender New York’s claims in the Vermont region, distinguished it from the other
states.”
8The recent experience of Peru illustrates how the response to civil conﬂicts may be obstructed by the system of
check and balances. Only ﬁve months after his self-coup of 1992, which gave him exclusive powers, Alberto Fujimori
ended the guerilla war faced by the government since 1980 in the highlands of Ayacucho. After this he won the 1995
presidential elections in the ﬁrst round of voting. In 2009 he was convicted for his role in killings and kidnappings,
and for embezzlement and bribery. Another case, described in the empirical section, is the strong government of
Porﬁrio D´ ıaz in 1884, which was a fundamental cause for the reduction of rural rebellions in Mexico (Katz, 1988).
9This paper is not about the most eﬃcient way of designing institutions in order to avoid civil conﬂicts. Although
there is not a consensus on that issue, there are constitutional theories that try to address it, like the consociational
approach (Lijphart, 1995) and the incentives approach (Horowitz, 2002). However, most constitutions, even the
relatively new ones in Eastern Europe, seem to have a very large idiosyncratic component, despite these theories and
the increasing involvement of international experts and practitioners in their design (Horowitz, 2002).
10Nunn (2008) includes population density in 1750 as a control in his estimations, which may capture the mechanism
proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) to link colonialism and current development.
4The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. The empirical evidence
for countries that became independent after WWII is shown in the ﬁrst part of Section 3. In the
second part the implications of the model for the post-independence period in the Americas are
discussed and tested. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
The Environment
The economy is divided into N + 1 districts indexed by j. Each of these districts is populated
by a representative agent. A district j may be in conﬂict or in peace. Deﬁne sj =1i ft h e r ei sa
conﬂict in district j,a n dsj = 0 otherwise. It is assumed for simplicity that there are only N +2
aggregate states, one state where every district is in peace, sj =0 ,∀j,a n dN +1 states where only
one district is in conﬂict, sj = 1 and s−j = 0. Deﬁne by S = 1 an aggregate state where there is a
conﬂict in one district (sj = 1 for some j), and S = 0 otherwise. As will be clear later there are
only three states for an individual member: s =( sj,S −j) ∈{ (0,0),(1,0),(0,1)},w h e r eS−j =1i f
S = 1 and sj = 0, i.e. there is a conﬂict but not in j’s district, and S−j = 0 otherwise. Output in





1i f ( 0 ,0)
0i f ( 1 ,0)
1/θ < 1i f ( 0 ,1)
Thus θ>1 captures the fact that a conﬂict is costly for all regions, independently of where
it occurs. Agents are risk neutral and ﬂow utility is uj =( 1− τj)yj − sjζ,w h e r eτj is the tax
rate in district j,a n dζ>0 captures the fact that a conﬂict may destroy the factors available for
production. Notice that the pair (θ,ζ) determines how asymmetric are the costs of conﬂicts. In
particular the lower is θ and the higher is ζ, the more asymmetric are the costs of conﬂicts11.
The transitional probabilities between states are given by p, which captures the exogenous
probability of conﬂict onset, and q, which captures the endogenous probability of ending a conﬂict12.
11It is natural to think about θ as district-speciﬁc, and so to deﬁne yj =1 /θij < 1 when there is a conﬂict in
district i. The model in this case could only be solved numerically, as the number of states is much larger. If this
heterogeneity makes the expected costs of conﬂicts less uncertain then it would aﬀect the main prediction because
the commitment problem becomes weaker. Otherwise it will only aﬀect the ex-post cost distribution, including the
costs of the response to rebellions.
12Although it simpliﬁes the model and facilitates the mapping to the data, making the probability of conﬂict onset
exogenous may seem unrealistic. If endogenous but not caused by political institutions then the model predictions
would not change. Otherwise, if p depends on political institutions, which may be the natural case, but still has an
exogenous component, then the structure presented below is ﬂexible enough to accommodate the endogenous eﬀect
as a cost of not constraining the executive, and the exogenous component as the factor causing diﬀerences in political
institutions.
5That is, if there is peace in the country, then the probability of a conﬂict in the following period
is given by p. There is an equal probability of conﬂict onset in each district, so the probability to
observe a conﬂict in district j after observing peace in the country is p/(N + 1). This implies a
high degree of uncertainty in terms of the costs of future conﬂicts. If there is a conﬂict in district
j the probability of it ending this period is q. Finally it is assumed that a conﬂict can move to
another district with probability pN/(N+1) if it is not terminated in the current period13. Deﬁning




























In case of conﬂict tax revenues are used to ﬁnance a military response. Thus the probability of





where the normalization by the constant N is for simpliﬁcation.
It is also assumed that q depends negatively on p. Therefore p not only captures how likely is
the onset of a conﬂict, but also its expected duration. This assumption follows the ﬁnding in the
empirical literature on civil wars, where (exogenous) geographic conditions that hinder government
actions, inﬂuence both onset and persistence. It is also useful to help map the model into the data
in the next section. For simplicity the following function is assumed for q:
q = max{0,Q(λT) − p} (1)
where Q  > 0, Q   < 0, Q(0) = 0, and Q(1) ≤ 1. Thus, when the executive is not able to collect
a suﬃcient amount of resources the probability of ending a conﬂict is zero. This introduces a
discontinuity in the model. We further assume max(Q(λT)) = Q(λ/θ) >pto get q>0 at least
for suﬃciently large revenues. The positive constant λ captures how eﬃcient the government is in
collecting taxes and investing the revenues to form a military response. The parameter θ has a
similar eﬀect than λ on q because it reduces the resources available for given tax rates. In order
to distinguish between the eﬀects coming from eﬃciency (λ) from those coming from asymmetric
costs (θ) we normalize λ = ˜ λθ,w i t h˜ λ>0, and we conduct comparative statics with respect to ˜ λ.
Finally the linearity of q on p greatly simpliﬁes the model.
Taxes need to be set every period there is conﬂict in any district (S = 1). Policymaking is
modelled using the legislative bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Each district has
13This is necessary when restricting the existence of a conﬂict to only one district at any point in time, as is done
here to reduce the number of states and simplify the model. If it is assumed that the conﬂict can not move between
districts then it may be better for a member to maintain the conﬂict in another district because in this case the
probability of conﬂict arising in his own district is zero. This worsens the commitment problem.
6a member in the legislature. As agents are identical inside each district we do not model elections.
There is one agent, the executive, with agenda power. He does not represent any district, nor can he
commit to future proposals, and he dislikes conﬂicts14. He proposes the set (τj)N+1
j=1 , which deﬁnes
a tax rate for every district. This proposal has to be approved by M members of the legislature to
be implemented, otherwise τj = 0 in all districts is the outcome. The ratio m = M/N captures the
constraints on the executive, and it is set in the initial period and under S = 0. As members of the
legislature are ex-ante identical there is no disagreement, and so we may assume that m is chosen
by unanimity, after which it is assumed exogenous15. As usual the subset of members whose votes
are decisive for approving the proposal is called the minimum winning coalition (WC).
To keep the model simple it is assumed that taxes are zero when there is peace. The beneﬁts of
more constraints on the executive are introduced as a function I(m), with I (m) > 0, I (0) = ∞,
and I  (m) < 0. This function enters ﬂow utility linearly in every state. Possible beneﬁts are a
lower probability of expropriation, a higher provision of public goods, or a lower probability of
intra-elite conﬂicts. These are not modeled explicitly since this has been done before, and because
our focus is on the costs of having more constraints16. Now we can deﬁne the value functions for






































where δ is the discount rate.
Equilibrium
The focus is on Markov equilibria. First the model is solved for a given value of m. This implies
ﬁnding a proposal (τj)N+1
j=1 that has the support of a WC. Once this is done we obtain q∗ = q(m),
the equilibrium value of ending a conﬂict as a function of m. This function is constant over time
since the executive can not commit to future proposals. After this function is characterized the
ﬁrst period problem can be solved, which consists of ﬁnding m∗ that maximizes the utility of the
14Assuming that the agenda setter is a member of the legislature does not change the results but introduces an
asymmetry that complicates the solution of the model, because the policy function is diﬀerent when the conﬂict arises
in the district of the executive.
15The ratio m is assumed to be continuous, which may be the case if the number of legislators per district varies.
16I
 (m) could be a function of other exogenous variables, which will aﬀect the equilibrium level of m as well. One
of these determinants may be the degree of heterogeneity inside the elite. When the elite is more heterogeneous it
may be easier for the executive to expropriate, for example by distorting relative prices, or it may be more convenient
to transfer public resources to a subset of the elite instead of providing public goods. Thus elite heterogeneity may
increase the marginal beneﬁt of constraining the executive, an insight that will be useful for analyzing the empirical
results.
7members of the legislature under S = 0. Finally the eﬀects of (p,θ,ζ, ˜ λ)o nm∗ can be explored,
which will guide the empirical exercise.
First ﬁx m>0. The problem of the executive is very simple. Because conﬂicts are costly
for him and he does not bear any costs of ﬁnancing a military response, he chooses (τj)N+1
j=1 to
maximize q as deﬁned in Equation (1). Notice that this is equivalent to maximizing total output in
the economy. If he does not face any constraint he would set τj =1i na l lt h eN districts in peace,
so q would take its maximum value, q = Q(˜ λ) − p>0. Then it is clear that the only constraint
that he faces is to get the approval of the WC. He will propose τNWC =1 ,a n dt h ep r o p o s a lf o rτWC








+ δ [(1 − n)pVj(1,0) + (1 − (1 − n)p)Vj(0,1)]
The ﬁrst term is the utility of a member of the WC of accepting the proposal, while the last
term is the value of the status-quo, where there are no tax revenues to ﬁnance the military response
to a conﬂict, and so q = 0. This condition is equivalent to,
δq[Vj(0,0) − Vj(0,1)] ≥
τWC
θ
The LHS of this expression is the future total gain from a military response for an individual
member of the legislature, while the RHS is the corresponding cost. The former depends on how
eﬃcient the government is at ﬁghting the conﬂict and the expected value of ending it. The higher is
the LHS, the higher the tax rate the executive is able to set for members of the WC. Since eﬃciency
is decreasing in m because fewer members pay the maximum tax, the higher is m the lower is τWC.
Likewise, as the expected value of ending the conﬂict is increasing in θ, the higher is θ the higher is
τWC. Notice that the constraint does not depend on V (1,0). This is in part what makes m relevant:
once a conﬂict has erupted in some other district a member of the elite has a lower incentive to
ﬁnance a military response than before its onset, when it is uncertain if the conﬂict will occur in his
district. As he can not commit ex-ante to some given amount of resources to ﬁnance the response,
any member of the elite may ﬁnd it optimal to change the institutional environment so he ﬁnds it
more diﬃcult to block a proposal.
To solve for the equilibrium value of τWC we need to know how the relative value of peace,
Vj(0,0) − Vj(0,1), is aﬀected by τWC. Using the fact that the equilibrium outcome is constant
over time and that there is a probability m of being part of the WC in the future, so E(τ)=
(1/θ)(mτWC +( 1− m)) in (2), this equation can be used to express the relative value of peace as a
function of τWC and the exogenous parameters,
Vj(0,0) − Vj(0,1) =
1







8Therefore the proposed tax rate, τWC, will be such that,
δq(θ − m)
1 − δ(1 − p)+δq(1 − m)
≥ τWC (3)
and tax revenues will be,
T =
m(τWC − 1) + 1
θ
Proposition 1.
– For every m ∈ (0,1] there is a unique τ∗
WC, which, together with τ∗
NWC =1 ,i sp r o p o s e da n d
accepted each period when S =1 .
– There exist constants ¯ θ>1 and ¯ m ∈ (0,1) such that the functions τ∗
WC = τWC(m) and q∗ = q(m)
are strictly decreasing in m if m ∈ (0, ¯ m) and θ<¯ θ.I fθ>¯ θ,t h e nτ∗
WC =1 ,a n di fm>¯ m
and θ<¯ θ,t h e nτ∗
WC =0 .
–I fm ∈ (0, ¯ m) and θ<¯ θ, τ∗
WC and q∗ are strictly increasing in θ and ˜ λ, and strictly decreasing
in p.B o t hτ∗
WC and q∗ are independent of ζ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition shows that ex-post, once a conﬂict has erupted in some district, the executive
w o u l db ea b l et os e tah i g h e rτ in the district of the WC members the higher are θ and ˜ λ and the
lower are p and m.Ah i g h e rθ means that the conﬂict is more costly for the members of the districts
which ﬁnance the military response. This is why, for θ>¯ θ, there will be no commitment problem
and so m would not constrain the response to conﬂicts. Conﬂicts with high θ may be those when
the whole elite is threatened, i.e. interstate wars and revolutions, or when the elite’s main source
of power is aﬀected, perhaps oilﬁelds as one example. If the environment is more prone to conﬂicts,
w h i c hi sc a p t u r e db yah i g h e rp, the eﬀectiveness of a military response falls and so the members
of the WC only accept lower taxes, which in turn imply a lower q in equilibrium17. Similarly, if
the government is less eﬃcient (lower ˜ λ), taxes fall, increasing the negative eﬀect on q. Taxes also
fall with m.A s m rises there will be fewer districts paying the maximum tax. That has both a
direct and an indirect eﬀect on q, as the lower eﬃcacy of the military response lowers the tax that
members of the WC are willing to accept. As explained earlier the eﬀect of m is discontinuous, so
only below ¯ m this result holds. Above that level revenues are not enough to make Q(λT) >p ,a n d
so no positive tax is accepted in equilibrium. Finally, as taxes are set once a conﬂict has erupted
17Notice that this eﬀect is only due to the assumption that q depends on p, i.e. that a conﬂict is more diﬃcult
to ﬁght when p is high. If the relationship in Equation (1) were not linear there would be an additional eﬀect of p
through the likelihood of conﬂict onset. This probability lowers the value of peace and therefore reduces the incentives
to ﬁght.
9and they are used to end that speciﬁc conﬂict, ζ i sn o tr e l e v a n tf o rt h eW Ca tt h em o m e n tt h e y
evaluate the proposal18.
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Because members of the legislature are homogeneous under S = 0, their problems are identical.
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The LHS is the marginal beneﬁt and the RHS the marginal cost of increasing m. The ﬁrst term
inside the square brackets captures the eﬀect of m on the expected length of conﬂicts through its
eﬀect on q. A marginal decrease in q has an expected cost equal to the ﬂow utility without conﬂicts,
minus the expected ﬂow utility if there is a conﬂict. The second term captures the fact that there
is a higher probability of being in the WC, and so to pay τWC instead of τNWC =1 .
Proposition 2.
If θ>¯ θ, m∗ =1for any p, ˜ λ and ζ.O t h e r w i s e∃ constants ζ and ¯ ζ,w h e r eζ < ¯ ζ, and such that,
–i fζ<ζ , m∗ =1for any p, ˜ λ and ζ.
–i fζ>¯ ζ, m∗ ∈ (0, ¯ m) is unique (and then q∗ > 0). Moreover in this case m∗ is strictly
decreasing in p and ζ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To analyze the results notice that at this stage members of the elite decide on the optimal
response to conﬂicts, q∗. We can see this in Equation (4), where the costs of m manifest mainly
through that variable. Then the exogenous parameters may have either a direct eﬀect on the
marginal cost, because they change the desired response to conﬂicts, or an indirect eﬀect, coming
from Proposition 1, as they aﬀect the ability to collect taxes ex-post. Parameters ζ, p,a n dθ all
raise the marginal cost of m since all of them increase the expected cost of conﬂicts. Thus, members
of the legislature are willing to spend more on military reactions, something that is hindered in
the future by a high m. In the case of ζ there is no indirect eﬀect, so it is clear that m needs
18This last result is obtained because of the assumption that q does not aﬀect the probability that the ongoing
conﬂict may move to other districts.
10to go down to increase the size of the military response. If ζ is too low, the proposition shows
that m∗ = 1: if conﬂicts are not costly then there are no costs of imposing more constraints. An
increase in p raises the marginal cost through both the direct and the indirect eﬀects. This latter
eﬀect is due to the reduction in revenues ex-post after an increase in p due to the lower eﬃcacy of
a military campaign. The eﬀect on m is then unambiguous, it falls with an increase in p19.I nt h e
case of θ the indirect eﬀect lowers the marginal cost because more revenues are collected for a given
value of m as shown in Proposition 1. Ex-post tax rates rise because the conﬂict is more costly
for members ﬁnancing the military response, even though it occurs in a diﬀerent district. Thus,
since a higher θ implies a larger optimal response ex-ante, its eﬀect on m is ambiguous. However,
if θ is above some threshold ¯ θ, there is no commitment problem, so again there are no costs of
imposing constraints on the executive. In this case m is not an instrument useful to enlarge the
military response. A change in ˜ λ has also an ambiguous eﬀect on the marginal cost, and therefore
its eﬀect on m is also ambiguous. On the one hand lower eﬃciency means less capacity to collect
taxes ex-post, and therefore m should be lower for the same value of q∗. But on the other hand,
even ex-ante, legislators are less willing to ﬁnance military campaigns, and so they are not willing
to bear the costs of a higher m. Finally, although by construction, it is worth noticing that a more
heterogeneous elite, a possible determinant of I (m) as explained above, would lead to higher levels
of m.
Thus, the negative eﬀect of p on m, which is the main implication of the model, depends on
the thresholds ¯ θ and ζ.I fθ ≥ ¯ θ or ζ<ζthen there is no commitment problem. In the ﬁrst case
everyone in the legislature agrees ex-post on maximizing the resources to ﬁnance a military response
to conﬂicts, in the second the ex-ante desired response is so small that the lack of commitment
is not a problem. In these cases m has only beneﬁts, and then m∗ = 1. Therefore, assuming
everything else constant, we can conclude that the constraints imposed on the executive (m)i n
peacetime should be lower in countries where potential conﬂicts are more likely and diﬃcult to be
fought (higher p), but only when their costs are uncertain and highly asymmetric among members
of the elite (high ζ and low θ).
3 The Evidence
This section tries to empirically validate the main prediction of the model. We do this in two
ways. First the model is tested using a sample of countries that became independent after WWII.
The model is also used to explain the experience of former colonies in the Americas during the
nineteenth century. Diﬀerent strategies are used in each of these exercises to identify the likelihood
of conﬂicts that impose uncertain asymmetric costs on members of the elite.
19Notice that the direct eﬀect of p, unlike the indirect eﬀect through ex-post revenues, is because of the change in













Figure 1: Theoretical Predictions Conditional on ζ>¯ ζ and θ<¯ θ
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical relationships among the main variables in the model, condi-
tional on observing ζ>¯ ζ and θ<¯ θ. It also shows the expected eﬀects on the likelihood of observing
a conﬂict at any point in time, denoted by CC. This variable, not deﬁned explicitly in the last
section, is useful to explain the empirical strategy. The exogenous variable is p, the probability of
future civil conﬂicts. Relationship 3 exists by deﬁnition because, everything else constant, a higher
probability means that we should observe more conﬂict in equilibrium. Likewise, q, the likelihood of
a conﬂict ending, reduces CC, explaining 5. Link 2 is negative and exists by construction, because
Equation (1) deﬁnes q as a function of p. Relationship 4, which comes from Proposition 1, means
that more constraints on the executive, m, lowers the likelihood of ending a conﬂict. This is key
in generating relationship 1, which is the main prediction of the model and the one we test in this
section. Since a higher m reduces q, making a conﬂict more likely to be observed, the ruling class
may prefer to lower m when facing a high p. This is the result in Proposition 2. Finally notice
that there is no direct relationship between m and CC since the former is set before the latter is
realized.
There are two important diﬃculties when trying to prove relationship 1. First we do not observe
p. We only have a good indicator of m (as explained below), and we may observe CC in some
cases. Second, 4 and 5 makes CC endogenous, implying that the correlation between CC and m
is not a good object for characterizing 1. To solve these problems we use proxies for p. These
proxies not only need to be associated with the likelihood of future conﬂicts having high ζ and low
θ, they also need to be unaﬀected by changes in m. In the ﬁrst exercise we take advantage of a
good database on civil conﬂicts and apply a TSLS strategy to better capture the particular form
of 3. In the second exercise we do not observe CC, but we claim that the proxy we use is closely
related to the likelihood of conﬂicts, so we are able to study its direct eﬀect on m.
A common feature of both exercises is the use of the variable Constraints on the Executive,
from the Polity IV database, to capture institutional design, or the variable m in the model. Unlike
others, this index explicitly measures how constrained the executive is in making arbitrary decisions,
and so it seems an excellent mapping from the model into the data. In particular it “...refers to the
extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives... imposed
12by any accountability groups [like] legislatures... the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of
nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and ... a strong,
independent judiciary... [It captures] the checks and balances [in] the decision-making process.”
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2007). A particular beneﬁt of using this variable is that it is not directly
aﬀected by the fraction of people with voting rights. Best scores are possible with large groups
excluded from the political process (and vice versa). For instance, South Africa under apartheid,
and the US before the National Voting Rights Act of 1965, had the top-coded score, while France
today does not. In the case of the Americas during the nineteenth century we observe countries
with very high scores like Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, coexisting with voting restrictions leading
to no more than 15% of the population with voting rights (Colomer, 2004). This property is useful
to test the model because our prediction is only about the constraints that the elite imposes on the
chief executive, not about the constraints that the whole population imposes on the government or
elite.
An additional issue is how to identify the period of institutional design. In the ﬁrst exercise,
when we study the experience of the countries that became independent after WWII, it is assumed
that this is done during the ﬁrst years after independence. This allows us to separate the eﬀects
of the risk of civil conﬂicts, for which the model has a clear prediction, from the eﬀect of actual
conﬂicts, for which we do not have a prediction. In the case of the Americas, basically because of
the type of conﬂicts considered and because of historical developments described below, we take
the ﬁrst decades after independence as the period of institutional building. Therefore we resort to
the empirical literature on the persistence of political institutions to link our dependent variable
with current political and economic conditions. In particular a simple regression shows that about
half of the diﬀerence in the constraints imposed after independence persisted until 2006 for the
group of 92 countries in our sample of states that became independent after WWII. In the case of
the Americas, 15% of the diﬀerence in 1900 persists until 2006 for our group of 21 countries20.
3.1 Civil Wars in The Post War Period
This section implements cross-country TSLS regressions to test the main implication of the model
for a sample of countries that became independent after WWII. The basic exercise is to try to
explain political institutions at the time of institutional building, using the likelihood and expected
persistence of a future civil conﬂict as an explanatory variable. It is assumed that the institutional
building process occurs immediately after independence. The availability of data on the type of
civil conﬂicts suggested by the model for the post-war era determines the time frame of our sample.
As predicted by the model there are some characteristics civil wars should possess to generate
20Moreover, controlling for the constraints observed in 2006, those imposed after independence and in 1900 are
signiﬁcant in explaining GDP per capita today in these two groups respectively. These results show that our dependent
variable aﬀects GDP per capita today even without taking into account the persistence in political institutions.
13the main mechanism: they need to impose uncertain and asymmetric costs among members of
the elite. With respect to the asymmetry of costs, external conﬂicts and revolutions, which aﬀect
the elite as a whole, would not generate the required asymmetry. But civil war is deﬁned as
intra-state war with at least one organized rebel army, therefore external conﬂicts and popular
uprisings or revolutions are excluded from that deﬁnition. Wars of liberation for colonialism are
also excluded as it is required that the national government is actively involved (Collier and Hoeﬄer,
2007). Furthermore, as noted by Ray (2010), “many [civil] conﬂicts appear to be largely ethnic,
geographical, and religious in nature, while outright economic class struggle is relatively rare.”I n
particular one of the strongest relationships that the empirical literature has found is between
civil conﬂicts and geographic conditions, including mountains, forests and long distances from the
state’s center (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).
This illustrates the fact that most of these conﬂicts are, at least in the beginning, localized in
speciﬁc regions, mainly because these environments beneﬁt insurgents relative to more conventional
armies21. Therefore they particularly aﬀect members of the elite with economic interests on those
regions, which suggests asymmetric costs.
In terms of uncertainty, Kalyvas (2007) argues that an insight from case studies is that geography
“may trump pre-war allegiances”, as guerillas are typically strong in places where geography favors
them but where there were no apparent grievances among the population to justify a conﬂict.
Collier et al. (2009) analyze a sample of civil wars for the period 1965-2004 and ﬁnd support for
the “feasibility hypothesis” i.e., that where civil war is feasible it will occur without reference to
motivation. In light of these results it is not surprising that one of the main sources of unrest that
interacts with other features of the environment to facilitate civil wars is something as random as
crop failure (Kalyvas, 2007). Accordingly, Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall growth as an instrument
for economic stagnation to explain, successfully, the onset of civil wars.
All of these ﬁndings suggest that modern civil wars meet the main requirements imposed by
the model in terms of the asymmetry and uncertainty of their costs. This justiﬁes the empirical
strategy of estimating the eﬀect of the risk of these types of conﬂicts on political institutions. We
also exploit two additional issues. First we would expect that it is more likely to observe uncertain
and asymmetric costs arising from low-scale conﬂicts, so we distinguish in the estimations between
small and large armed conﬂicts. Second, natural resource availability, which raises the payoﬀ to
rebellion (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004), may be the most important factor reducing the asymmetry
and uncertainty of the allocation of the costs of conﬂict. These resources are commonly the main
source of wealth for elites and all members suﬀer when they are lost. Rebels often try to appropriate
these resources, and so the eruption of a conﬂict will be more likely in the region where these
are localized. Not all natural resources are geographically concentrated though. Illegal drugs like
21Kalyvas (2007) enumerates additional causes for the observation that most insurgencies begin and are fought
primarily in the rural countryside.
14cocaine, hash, and heroin, timber resources, and alluvial diamond mining, all having been identiﬁed
as very important in ﬁnancing civil wars, are more widely dispersed than oil or pit mining (Buhaug
and Gates, 2002). Therefore we distinguish in the estimations between the eﬀect of conﬂicts in
countries with and without signiﬁcant oil resources.
Of course, and as the model predicts, civil wars are endogenous. Everything else constant,
as shown by relationships 4 and 5 in Figure 1, fewer constraints on the executive should reduce
the likelihood of observing a civil war. Collier and Rohner (2008) ﬁnd that this is true for poor
countries using democracy as the institutional variable and diﬀerent types of violence as explanatory
variables. They argue that this is because democracy constrains the possibilities of government
repression. Similarly, Collier et al. (2008) show that less democratic countries are less likely to
revert to violence22. To overcome the endogeneity problem geographic conditions are used as an
instrument, exploiting the strong relationships the empirical literature has found between civil
conﬂicts and geographic variables to capture the exogenous likelihood and persistence of civil wars.
As argued by Hegre and Sambanis (2006), “rough terrain is ideal for guerrilla warfare and diﬃcult
for a government army to control. Mountain areas, giving advantage to rebel troops, allow the
rebels to expand the scope of conﬂict, whereas forests provide cover, particularly against detection
or aerial attack”. This is consistent with the conclusion by Kalyvas (2007) that geography “may
trump pre-war allegiances” and more generally with theories that focus on feasibility to explain the
causes of civil conﬂicts: a rebel group exists as a result of unusual conditions that enable it to be
viable during the period of violent conﬂict (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2007).
Additionally, and also following previous empirical literature on civil conﬂicts, we use rainfall
variability as an additional instrument. In particular, studies that exploit within-country variation
in the exogenous determinants of conﬂict have found signiﬁcant eﬀects of weather shocks. As
described above Miguel et al. (2004) use the growth rate in rainfall as an instrument for short-
term economic ﬂuctuations that trigger conﬂicts. They argue that this strategy is only valid for
countries with large agricultural sectors without extensive irrigation systems. Hence they consider
only African countries in their study. However there are additional channels trough which weather
shocks may aﬀect the likelihood of civil conﬂicts. Nel and Righarts (2008) analyze the relationship
between natural disasters and the risk of civil conﬂict. Using a sample of 187 political units from
1950 to 2000 they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the risk of civil conﬂict after climate-related disasters,
which basically include hydro-meteorological events. More recently Besley and Persson (2011) use
a measure of natural disasters, which includes ﬂoods and slides, as an explanatory variable for
civil wars and political repression. In our cross-section framework we claim that in countries with
22An alternative hypothesis is that better institutional constraints limit the stake of politics and the pay-oﬀ from
overthrowing the government, lowering the incidence of violence (North et al., 2009; Besley and Persson, 2011). In
this case these institutional constraints must be very diﬃcult to change, as they should persist after the government is
overthrown. Another eﬀect is that weaker constraints could generate more intra-elite conﬂict. The regression results
may help to determine which eﬀect is more important.
15historically larger rainfall variability the incidence of extreme whether shocks is more important,
raising the likelihood of conﬂict23. Since we are interested in both onset and persistence, we think
it is better to include rough terrain and rain volatility together as instruments instead on including
only one of them24.
The empirical literature on civil wars has also found signiﬁcant time eﬀects when explaining
the onset of civil wars, probably due to the eﬀect of the Cold War. To exploit this source of
variability the year of independence is used as an additional instrument instead of rain variability
as a robustness analysis.
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The variable XCj,indep is the ﬁve year average of constraints on the executive after indepen-
dence25. CCjt is a variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a civil war in country j and year
t. Our source is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008). UCDP/PRIO
deﬁnes armed conﬂict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.” In particular, CCjt takes a value of one
when internal armed conﬂict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal
opposition group(s) regardless of intervention from other states. Thus the endogenous explanatory
variable CCj not only captures the onset of a civil war, but also how persistent it is, as required
by the model. There are other data sets with detailed information about civil wars. However, to
my knowledge, the UCDP/PRIO Dataset is the only one that includes conﬂicts with as low as 25
battle-related deaths in a year. Other data sets use a 1000 deaths threshold. As discussed above
low scale conﬂicts are more likely to meet the requirements of the model, so we prefer this dataset.
This also allows us to distinguish between small and large conﬂicts, an exercise we implement be-
low. RTj is the rough terrain variable used by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre and Sambanis
(2006), corresponding to the proportion of the country that is mountainous. RVj is our measure of
rain volatility in country j, and it is deﬁned as the log of the ratio between one plus the average
23In doing so we take into account that the countries in our sample are poor and probably not able to oﬀset the
eﬀect of these events with better infrastructure when they are very likely. The model implies that, at least in terms
of their eﬀect on conﬂict, political institutions may be an oﬀsetting mechanism.
24Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) ﬁnds that democratic conditions improve after severe rain shocks. This should not
inﬂuence the exclusion condition because our focus is on initial (post-independence) institutional quality.
25Results are unchanged if we use the three year average instead of the ﬁve year average.
16monthly maximum rainfall, and one plus the average monthly minimum rainfall. The source is
Parker (1997). Finally ˆ CCj is the predicted value of CCj using the estimated parameters from
Equation (7).
Additional control variables, included in the vector Xkj, are fractionalization, whether the
country was a British colony at the moment of independence , and whether the existence of oil
reserves was known at the moment of independence. The source for the fractionalization variable is
Humphreys (2005). This variable has been used extensively in empirical papers to explain civil wars
but without success, although there are good theoretical reasons to expect it to have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the incidence of civil wars (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2007; Kalyvas, 2007; Blattman and Miguel,
2010). Fractionalization could be a determinant of the beneﬁts of constraining the executive, i.e.
the function I(m) in the model, and therefore may be an explanatory variable for the constraints
on the executive as well. The dummy for British colonies is included because the literature that
studies the late decolonization process concludes that these colonies were more likely to establish
good institutions. Smith (1987) enumerates a series of reasons the British were favored at the time
they withdrew from their colonies to established better institutions26. Finally the existence of oil
reserves is included as an additional explanatory variable. This variable takes a value of one when
the existence of oilﬁelds was known at the moment of independence. The source for this variable
is Humphreys (2005). An interaction of this variable with the civil conﬂict variable is introduced
to control for conﬂicts with low uncertainty and asymmetry as explained above. As a robustness
analysis we also include dummies for African countries and former USSR republics. All the data
used in the estimations is reported in Appendix B.
According to the model, we expect βTSLS
1 < 0a n dβTSLS
1 <β OLS
1 . The second relationship
captures a feature of the model that is necessary to obtain its main prediction, i.e. that more
constraints on the executive lead to a lower probability of observing a conﬂict (links 4 and 5 in
Figure 1), a statistical relationship that is only captured by the OLS speciﬁcation. An additional
reason to expect diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients is that our instruments are chosen to capture primarily
the type of conﬂicts for which our theory predicts there is a negative relationship with political
institutions. If other conﬂicts are still included in CCj despite the discussion above, they would
not be well captured by the instruments, and hence, unlike in the OLS case, the second-stage
coeﬃcients would not include their eﬀects27. Finally we also expect a positive interaction between
oil reserves and conﬂict, and a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of both rough terrain and rain
variability in the ﬁrst-stage.
26Among them is the fact that in the last decades of colonialism the British implemented reforms which associated
the peoples in the colonies closely to their own governing, something not observed in the French, Portuguese or
Belgian colonies.
27The case of Israel is illustrative in this respect. Through inter-state armed conﬂicts Israel occupied or annexed
vast territories, which gave rise to a number of intrastate conﬂicts (UCDP Conﬂict Encyclopedia, Uppsala University).
Clearly in this case the main mechanism of the model does not apply. Accordingly CC is more than three times ˆ CC
in the case of Israel.
17(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS TSLS Inst Inst
Civil Conﬂict 0.097 −1.482∗∗ 0.040 −1.607∗∗ −3.483∗∗
0.188 0.666 0.171 0.702 1.676
Fractionalization −0.027 0.160 0.180 0.123
0.129 0.232 0.303 0.102
British Colony 0.212∗∗ 0.218 0.235 −0.014
0.085 0.136 0.183 0.055
Oil Reserves 0.104 0.257∗ −0.290 0.106∗
0.087 0.136 0.246 0.059
Civil Conﬂict 3.270∗
× Oil Reserves 1.710
Rough Terrain 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
0.011 0.014
Rainfall Variability 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗
0.014 0.016
R2 0.004 0.101 0.105 0.229 0.254 0.118 0.176
Observations 92 92 86 86 86 92 86
Sargan statistic 0.544 0.806 1.203
F-statistic 7.555 7.865
Conditional LR p-value 0.001 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is XCj,indep and in columns (6) and
(7) is CCj (see the text for details). Robust standard errors are in italics, ∗ means
signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The Conditional LR
p-value is the p-value of the robust to weak instruments test by Moreira (2003) applied
to the endogenous regressor.
Table 1: Constraints on the Executive and the Risk of Civil Conﬂicts
Results are shown in Table 1. In the ﬁrst column we show the OLS estimation with civil
war as the only explanatory variable, and the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant and very close to zero.
When using the two stages procedure in column (2), again without other explanatory variables,
the coeﬃcient becomes negative and signiﬁcant, as expected. The ﬁrst-stage regression results are
shown in column (6), where we can see that both instruments are highly signiﬁcant and have the
expected sign, although they may be weak as deduced from the low level of the F-statistic relative
to the critical values reported by Stock and Yogo (2005). In order to see if this inﬂuences the results
we perform the Conditional LR test (Moreira, 2003), which is robust to weak instruments. In the
last row of Table 1 we present the p-value, which shows that the traditional t-test underestimates
the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient. It turns out that the latter is signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level
when the robust test is considered28. In columns (3) and (4) the additional explanatory variables
are included in the regressions. The eﬀect of civil war in the OLS case remains not signiﬁcant and
very close to zero, while in the TSLS case the coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant and negative, in line
with the model predictions. According to the robust Conditional LR test the coeﬃcient is still
signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level in this case.
28We also estimate the regressions using the LIML method, for which the critical values reported by Stock and
Yogo (2005) are smaller, and results do not change much.
18Africa Ex-USSR Africa and Ex-USSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS TSLS TSLS OLS TSLS TSLS OLS TSLS TSLS
Civil Conﬂict 0.053 −1.139∗∗ −2.883∗∗ 0.099 −1.396∗ −3.546∗ 0.075 −1.158∗ −3.358∗∗
0.165 0.570 1.436 0.169 0.722 1.923 0.167 0.614 1.698
Fractionalization 0.211 0.333 0.323 −0.036 0.135 0.176 0.166 0.347 0.392
0.146 0.228 0.307 0.125 0.216 0.290 0.150 0.251 0.361
British Colony 0.239∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.253 0.270∗∗∗ 0.246∗ 0.240 0.259∗∗∗ 0.237∗ 0.229
0.083 0.116 0.159 0.084 0.132 0.194 0.086 0.122 0.189
Oil Reserves 0.002 0.119 −0.327 0.106 0.241∗ −0.321 0.020 0.115 −0.426∗
0.094 0.117 0.208 0.092 0.132 0.266 0.098 0.119 0.241
Africa −0.280∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.217 −0.232∗∗ −0.278∗∗ −0.271
0.078 0.100 0.138 0.094 0.128 0.197
Ex-USSR 0.252∗∗ 0.127 0.017 0.104 −0.028 −0.140
0.111 0.137 0.211 0.126 0.152 0.237
Civil Conﬂict 2.833∗ 3.443∗ 3.375∗∗
× Oil Reserves 1.452 1.927 1.682
R2 0.219 0.286 0.314 0.172 0.248 0.294 0.227 0.286 0.345
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
Conditional LR p-value 0.004 0.008 0.013
Notes: The dependent variable is the ﬁve-year average constraints on the executive indicator. Robust standard errors
are in italics, ∗ means signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The Conditional LR p-value
is the p-value of the robust to weak instruments test by Moreira (2003) applied to the endogenous regressor.
Table 2: Constraints on the Executive and Civil Conﬂicts, Africa and Former USSR Dummies
Fractionalization is neither signiﬁcant explaining institutions in the second-stage (column 4),
nor it is explaining conﬂict in the ﬁrs-stage (column 7). British colony has a signiﬁcant and positive
eﬀect only in the OLS case. In the TSLS case the size of the coeﬃcient is similar but the standard
error rises. Hence the non-signiﬁcance may be due to the lower accuracy when estimating the two
stages. Oil reserves have both a direct positive, and an indirect negative eﬀect trough conﬂicts in
the TSLS case. This may be explained by the interaction eﬀect with civil wars that the model
predicts. This interaction is included in column (5)29. We can see now that the eﬀect of civil wars
on the constraints imposed on the executive is almost twice as large as before for countries without
oil reserves, but for countries with oil reserves the coeﬃcient becomes not signiﬁcant, in line with
the main predictions of the model. The direct eﬀect of oil reserves becomes not signiﬁcant when
the interaction is included.
Sargan tests, reported in Table 1, reject over-identiﬁcation. Accordingly when including each
instrument as an additional explanatory variable in the second-stage regressions these variables
are not signiﬁcant, suggesting that they do not have a direct eﬀect on the constraints imposed on
the executive. In Table 2 we show that results are unchanged when including dummy variables
29Here we treat the interaction term as endogenous and include interactions among the exogenous variables as
additional instruments to avoid estimating the forbidden regression (Wooldbridge, 2002). Since we have more than
one endogenous variable we can not apply the Conditional LR test.
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS TSLS Inst Inst
Civil Conﬂict 0.191 −1.973∗∗ 0.129 −2.163∗∗ −3.695∗∗
(Minor) 0.247 0.908 0.220 0.964 1.794
Fractionalization −0.030 0.119 0.075 0.067
0.126 0.253 0.308 0.087
British Colony 0.212∗∗ 0.218 0.230 −0.012
0.084 0.138 0.160 0.041
Oil Reserves 0.098 0.261∗ −0.165 0.083∗
0.086 0.144 0.217 0.049
Civil Conﬂict 2.427∗
× Oil Reserves 1.439
Rough Terrain 0.025∗∗ 0.027∗∗
0.010 0.012
Rainfall Variability 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗
0.011 0.013
R2 0.009 0.106 0.108 0.239 0.250 0.114 0.160
Observations 92 92 86 86 86 92 86
Sargan statistic 0.275 0.323 1.494
F statistic 6.426 6.636
Conditional LR p-value 0.001 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is XCj,indep and in columns (6)
and (7) is CCj (see the text for details). Robust standard errors are in italics, ∗ means
signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The Conditional
LR p-value is the p-value of the robust to weak instruments test by Moreira (2003)
applied to the endogenous regressor.
Table 3: Constraints on the Executive and the Risk of Minor Civil Conﬂicts
for Africa and for former USSR republics. Only the ﬁrst is signiﬁcant in the second-stage, and
neither of them is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage. With respect to the coeﬃcient on civil conﬂicts, its
signiﬁcance in the TSLS case remains very high, and it remains not signiﬁcant and close to zero in
the OLS case. According to the Conditional LR test only when both dummies are included at the
same time (column 8), the signiﬁcance falls below the 1% conﬁdence level.
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset allows us to distinguish between minor and large
conﬂicts. We exploit this to test if, as predicted by the model, results are stronger for smaller
conﬂicts. Low-scale conﬂicts are deﬁned as those where battle-related deaths are between 25 and
999 in a year. Large conﬂicts, or civil wars, are those conﬂicts with more than 999 battle-related
deaths in a year. In Table 3 we present the baseline estimations presented in Table 1, but redeﬁning
the variable CCjt to take the value one only when there is a minor conﬂict. These are about 77% of
the episodes captured in Table 1, and in Appendix B we report the new variable CCj constructed
under this deﬁnition. The sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients is unchanged, including the
interaction term with oil reserves, but now the eﬀect of the risk of conﬂicts on the constraints
imposed on the executive is larger than before. As discussed above, this is in line with the main
predictions of the model if these smaller conﬂicts are more closely related to the conditions needed
by its main mechanism.
20(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS TSLS Inst Inst
Civil Conﬂict 0.097 −0.827 0.040 −1.141∗∗ −2.999∗
0.188 0.598 0.171 0.563 1.551
Fractionalization −0.027 0.108 0.154 0.159
0.129 0.184 0.250 0.101
British Colony 0.212∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.232 −0.041
0.085 0.116 0.162 0.051
Oil Reserves 0.104 0.214∗ −0.224 0.109∗
0.087 0.118 0.234 0.057
Civil Conﬂict 2.771∗
× Oil Reserves 1.646




R2 0.004 0.031 0.105 0.177 0.236 0.118 0.194
Observations 92 92 86 86 86 92 86
Sargan statistic 0.000 0.095 0.919
F-statistic 7.138 9.479
Conditional LR p-value 0.104 0.009
Notes: The dependent variable is the ﬁve-year average constraints on the executive
indicator. Robust standard errors are in italics, ∗ means signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ sig-
niﬁcant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The Conditional LR p-value is the p-value
of the robust to weak instruments test by Moreira (2003) applied to the endogenous
regressor.
Table 4: Constraints on the Executive and Civil Conﬂicts using Independence as Instrument
Finally in Table 4 we show the results when, together with rough terrain, we use the year of
independence instead of rain volatility as an instrument in the baseline speciﬁcations. As expected
the eﬀect of the year of independence is negative and highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage (columns
6 and 7). Results are not as strong as before but the general pattern persists. In particular
when no additional control variables are included the OLS coeﬃcient is still close to zero and not
signiﬁcant. In the TSLS case the coeﬃcient on civil conﬂict remains negative but the signiﬁcance
falls. According to the robust Conditional LR test it is signiﬁcant at a 10% level. When the other
control variables are included in columns (4) and (5), the signiﬁcance is again very high (at the 1%
level) and the size of the coeﬃcients very similar to those reported in Table 1.
3.2 The Americas after Independence
In the aftermath of independence the new countries in the Americas, particularly in Latin America,
suﬀered a vacuum of political power, which led to lack of governance and numerous armed conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst decades were chaotic and disorganized; there was little institutionalization and almost no
agreement on national goals or ideology (Wiarda, 2005). The wars of independence unleashed a
crisis with power struggles between regional elites or caudillos for control of the new independent
21countries, predatory militarism, and clashes between civilians and the military, or between the
church and anticlerical forces. Besides internal wars and economic stagnation, Latin America fell
victim to foreign interventions and numerous border wars, especially in Central America (Bates
et al., 2007)30.
After a short period where power was generally held by radical groups, who favored wide
popular participation following the spirit of the wars of independence, conservatives dominated
politics. This group supported the rebuild of the colonial order so as to secure authority over the
lower classes. In constitutional terms, see e.g. Loevman (1993), Gargarella (2004) and Wiarda
(2005), they supported a strong presidency. They saw the executive as a national authority with
the means to prevent internal disorders, and so they invested him with extraordinary powers during
internal or external crises, when he could declare a state of emergency, suspend the constitution,
and rule by decree. They also defended centralist governments, weak parliaments and courts, and a
powerful army, which was constitutionally obliged to step in when disorder broke out. Consequently,
authoritarian governments were common throughout the region in the aftermath of independence.
The rise of conservatives in almost every country after 1820 in the context of intra-elite conﬂicts
can be potentially explained by the model. According to its main prediction, fragmented societies
like the ones in Latin America after independence needed to concentrate political power to impose
order. But authoritarism raised the expected pay-oﬀ from controlling the government, increasing
the incentives to ﬁght with diﬀerent factions inside the ruling class.
Nevertheless we do not test the model empirically by trying to explain the events that occurred
during these decades. There is little variance during that period in terms of executive power,
beyond the diﬀerences between North America and Latin America. Neither is there data to capture
the incidence nor the main features of the conﬂicts, which would need to comply with the main
requirements described in the previous section in order to apply the main mechanism of the model.
Finally, if there was a serious eﬀort in building institutions during these decades, the process was
probably inﬂuenced by the ongoing conﬂicts in most of the countries, further obscuring the mapping
of the model into the data. The focus of our empirical exercise is on racial conﬂicts, for which we
have better proxies and that, according to the model, should have continued to inﬂuence political
institutions after the “lost decades” following independence.
Indeed historians have identiﬁed the fear of a race war as one of the main causes for the lack
of revolutionary support by the elites in the Americas at the end of the nineteenth century, mainly
because the colonial pact also consisted on the eﬀective maintenance of the internal colonialism of
white over non-white which the Catholic monarchy had been able to provide (Williamson, 2009,
p.203). The white oligarchies in the Americas did not have representative political institutions
or access to high government posts. But this was the price that had to be paid for the massive
30Countries that achieved order notably early were Brazil, which maintained the system of monarchy, and Chile,
which established a centralized republican government. In both cases it has been documented that the elites were
relatively homogeneous at that time as well (Collier and Sater, 2004; Williamson, 2009)
22legitimacy of the Catholic monarchy, that could best evoke loyalty to the established order from
the Indian communities and the lower classes of Hispanics, blacks and mixed-bloods in the colonies
(Williamson, 2009, p.115). In short, the elite needed imperial protection from the slaves and
indigenous peasants, and only when the king faltered, did settler elites in the empire understand
they could no longer rely on Spain to protect them (Bates et al., 2007).
The most spectacular, notorious, and disturbing indigenous uprising in the Colonial period
exploded across Peru in 1780, led by T´ upac Amaru (Eakin, 2007; Drake, 2009). Other notable
episodes were the revolt by the Aymara speakers in Upper Peru, the comunero revolt in Colombia,
the local revolts linked to the Hidalgo movement in Mexico, and a mulatto revolt in the northeastern
province of Bahia in Brazil. Although these uprisings had important costs for the elites -including
in some cases the indiscriminate slaughtering of whites-, they were far from seizing political power.
All of them were brutally suppressed, save the Haitian Revolution -a colony where roughly 95%
of the population were slaves-, the only successful non-white rebellion in the Americas’ colonial
period, and an event that kept alive the fear of race war among the elites throughout the continent
in the nineteenth century.
Rebellion by the lower classes continued to be endemic after independence. Katz (1988), an-
alyzing rural rebellions in Mexico, argues that rural revolts between 1810 and 1920 aﬀected that
country much more than such revolts had ever inﬂuenced the territory during the colonial period.
This was particularly the case in central Mexico, where rebellions became more common, larger,
and bloodier, and repression more pronounced. Between 1840 and 1870 there was an unprecedented
resurgence of village revolts, race wars, and regional rebellions (Coatsworth, 1988). According to
Katz (1988) and in line with the model, one of the reasons for this was the greater strength of
the Spanish crown relative to the new Mexican state. Moreover he argues that post-independence
rebellions became less common around 1884 due, among other factors, to the beginning of the
strongest state that independent Mexico had ever known, led by Porﬁrio D´ ıaz, despite the massive
expropriation of villagers’ lands by wealthier classes that began in the late nineteenth century.
Coatsworth (1988) surveys the literature on rural rebellions since the end of the seventeenth
century in Latin America31. This literature consists mainly of case studies and therefore is not
exhaustive. Most of the events studied took place in Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil.
In the case of revolts involving Mesoamerican and Andean villages, Coatsworth (1988) distinguishes
three main types: land invasions, village riots, and caste wars. All of these involved high degrees
of violence, including theft and assassinations, and they were mostly directed against the rural
elites: land owners in the ﬁrst case, public oﬃcials in the second case, and whites in the third
case. Caste wars, regional uprisings directed towards the expulsion or elimination of non-Indian
authority, were the largest revolts, while the most common and prolonged revolts involved formal
31Although the author recognizes that rebellions in cities and towns were also very common and similar to rural
rebellions, they are not included in this analysis
23and informal alliances between Indian villagers and non-Indian low classes. Finally slave-based
revolts consisted of plantation riots and uprisings, slave insurrections, and maroon warfare. Slave
insurrections, although uncommon, usually sought the expulsion or extermination of the European
elite and, together with caste wars, could arise from small riots via contagion, a danger recognized
by ruling classes throughout Latin America (Coatsworth, 1988, p.30).
Because the analysis is based on case studies for certain countries only, numbers are not very
informative. However they give a lower bound on the number of conﬂicts. Coatsworth (1988)
reports 521 village riots and uprisings, and 286 slave-based revolts, from 1700 to 1899. In the case
of regional, “peasant”, and caste wars, he reports 6 events before 1810, and 42 thereafter; 23 in
Mexico, 8 in Brazil, 7 in Peru, and 10 in other countries (Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Jamaica). In the case of Mexico these rebellions took place in 15
diﬀerent regions. A similar pattern is observed in Brazil and Peru. This shows that they were not
localized only in some speciﬁc regions. Of 31 maroon wars and slave insurrections recorded between
1700 and 1832, 13 occurred in the Guianas, Suriname, and Venezuela, while the rest were spread
throughout the Caribbean islands and the mainland.
The model in this paper predicts that fear of race wars also aﬀected the institutions built
after independence. The main features of this type of conﬂict resemble those needed by the main
mechanism of the model, and there are good reasons to think that these risks persisted for most of
the nineteenth century. This is because independence was a political and not a social or economic
revolution. White elites still employed coerced non-white labor in agrarian or mining economies.
Therefore the risk of an uprising was virtually unchanged. Moreover there are reasons to expect
that the risk of uprisings by Indians and slaves was even higher after the lost decades following
independence. The improved long-run economic prospects in these economies increased this risk as,
for example, landowners tried to enlarge their land possessions at the expense of the lower classes,
or as the demand for forced labor increased (Coatsworth, 1988).
Indeed it has been documented by historians that the risk of uprisings by the lower classes,
together perhaps with the risk of intra-elite conﬂicts, was among the main reasons for the estab-
lishment of autocratic regimes throughout the continent after independence. The trade-oﬀ facing
the new political elite was similar to the one highlighted in the model: “...a contradiction appeared:
the only coherent political ideology available to [the elites] was liberalism, but democratic values
such as liberty and equality ... tended to undermine state authority in regionally dispersed societies
which were still seigniorial, hierarchical, racially divided and often based on slavery.” (Williamson,
2009, p.233). Given severe racial and class inequalities, elite fears of mass upheaval compelled many
of them to prefer authoritarism over republicanism, and where colonial rule relied on exploitation
of large indigenous or slave populations, that cleavage carried on past independence and hindered
democratic prospects (Drake, 2009, p.54). Eakin (2007) concludes that much of US history in the
aftermath of the revolution is about how to implement the ideals of the founding fathers, while in
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Figure 2: Blacks and Indians in the Americas, % of total pop, circa 1800
Latin America, where the elites all read, discussed, and exchanged the ideas of the age, the presence
of liberal ideals and principles is very weak and minimal, and the focus is on war and maintaining
elite control (Eakin, 2007, p.199).
The discussion so far makes clear that the existence of oppressed non-whites; Indians, blacks,
mulattoes, and even mestizos, generated a risk of conﬂicts for the white elites similar to those
highlighted by the model. It follows that a variable measuring non-whites as a fraction of to-
tal population may be a good explanatory variable for the constraints imposed on the executive
throughout the region. Unfortunately there are only measures of Indians and blacks available, so
we focus on these groups only. Mahoney (2003) estimates Indians and blacks as a fraction of total
population for diﬀerent countries in Latin America for the years around 1800. This variable is
complemented with data from McEvedy and Jones (1978) to expand the sample to most of the
former colonies in the Americas. Figure 2 shows the results. This fraction ranges from roughly
1% in Uruguay and Costa Rica, to more than 90% in Jamaica. Uruguay and Costa Rica, together
with Chile and Argentina which had low indigenous populations as well, have been identiﬁed as the
countries with the most democratic institutions in Latin America (Drake, 2009)32. On the other
hand Jamaica only obtained its independence in 1962, a fact that may have been motivated by the
example of Haiti (Eakin, 2007)33.
32The US, which shows the highest constraints on the executive since independence (and much higher than Latin
American countries), appears as a country with not a low but moderate fraction of Indians and blacks, between
Colombia and Paraguay. However blacks in the US were not dispersed as most of them went to the colonies in the
south. This weakens the main mechanism of the model as uncertainty about the distribution of the costs of uprisings
falls. Moreover there were important institutional diﬀerences between the south, with oligarchic institutions, and the
north, with more democratic institutions (Kim, 2009).
33Because of its late independence Jamaica is included in the previous estimations for the post-war period, but not
25But it is not easy to identify the period of institutional building in the Americas. It took
decades of civil discord before most of the countries could bring about enough order to construct
functioning governments (Drake, 2009, p.15). Countries that moved to less autocratic political
institutions made such changes slowly, only after the negative economic and political eﬀects of the
wars of independence started to be overcome, and with the help of new groups inside the elites
that appeared when the economies started to diversify. As stated by Williamson (2009), only after
about 1850 did overseas demand begin to pull a few Latin American economies out of stagnation,
leading to a degree of political consolidation and, in some republics, to a period of constitutional
politics and rule of law (Williamson, 2009, p.234). Liberals started to dominate politics. This
group, who particularly beneﬁted from overseas trade and new economic opportunities, supported
the creation of a modern liberal state following the US constitution. They tried to constrain the
potential abuses of the executive through limits on the president’s terms of oﬃce, restrictions on
his powers of veto, and the elimination of his exceptional powers (Gargarella, 2004; Drake, 2009).
In this context the model helps to explain which countries developed political institutions that
constrained the power of chief executives after the political and economic chaos following inde-
pendence, when better economic conditions and the diversiﬁcation of the economy, pushed by
international factors, led to order and a period of institutional building. By 1870 liberals dom-
inated politics in almost every country, but they were not always able, or willing, to establish
political institutions consistent with the liberal principles described above. To capture the process
of institutional design and how it was aﬀected by the fear of uprisings, we estimate the following
regression for every year since 1835,








The inclusion of constraints on the executive at the moment of independence as an additional
explanatory variable captures other features that may have aﬀected institutions, such as the colonial
system of government or the process of independence. As there is not too much variance across
countries in terms of initial constraints, results are very similar when this variable is not included.
Results are shown in Figure 3. In the left panel the sequence of β0,t is plotted. We observe
an increase in this coeﬃcient from 1830 to 1900, consistent with the facts documented in the prior
paragraphs. But in the right panel we can see that this was the case only in countries with small
Indian and black populations. The graph plots the sequence for β1,t,a n di tc a nb es e e nt h a ti t
becomes negative and signiﬁcant in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is interesting to see
that this coincides with the period of economic recovery and political domination by liberals. As
in the estimations below for the Americas.
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documented by Eakin (2007) (p.220), liberals sided with the option of authoritarian governments
once they obtained the political power in countries like Mexico and Brazil, but extended political
participation in countries like Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. This trend also coincides
with the generalized economic recovery and the emergence of new sectors in the economy. The latter
may have increased the marginal beneﬁts of constraining the government as explained in the last
section. As this happened, countries able to constrain their executive, because of a low risk of
internal conﬂicts, did so. On the other hand, the strong economic recovery may have increased
the risk of uprisings in countries with large Indian and slave populations, as argued by Coatsworth
(1988), contributing to the observed divergence as well.
It can also be seen in Figure 3 that the coeﬃcient capturing the eﬀects on institutions of the
likelihood of uprisings stays signiﬁcant for most of the twentieth century. Because race uprisings like
the ones highlighted by the model became less likely this shows that the eﬀects on political institu-
tions explained by the model had very persistent eﬀects. This may be either because the political
process makes them persistent, or because autocratic regimes had eﬀects on other determinants of
political institutions like inequality.
It is worth emphasizing that the empirical results are not a direct outcome of the exclusion of
certain groups from political participation. Ethnic friction, together with social inequalities, was
probably behind the diﬃculties in achieving democracy in Latin America. But in this case the
eﬀect is on the institutions regulating the relationship among the members of the elite and not
between them and the rest of the population34. To conﬁrm that the results really correspond to the
mechanism predicted by the model an interaction term with rough terrain (RT), the instrument for
civil conﬂict used in the last subsection, is introduced. As argued above this variable captures how
34As explained above, constraints on the executive is only indirectly related to the fraction of population voting in
elections. Moreover the fraction of the population voting in elections was much lower than the fraction of whites in
the population at that time (Colomer, 2004).
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diﬃcult is to ﬁght an uprising, thus a relatively larger oppressed population should have a larger
eﬀect on the constraints imposed on the executive in countries with a relatively higher value of RT.
Note results from this more complex speciﬁcation should be interpreted with caution because of
the small sample.
Results are shown in Figure 4. The red line corresponds to the marginal eﬀect of CC in a
country with the 90th percentile value of RT (between the value of Peru and Honduras), and the
blue line the marginal eﬀect for a country with the 10th percentile value of RT (between the value
of Brazil and Paraguay). As expected the eﬀect is signiﬁcant only in countries with high values of
RT, suggesting that the channel is the one predicted by the model: a larger population of Indians
and blacks meant a higher probability of civil conﬂicts, and when these conﬂicts were diﬃcult to
ﬁght, the elite needed to organize itself in a certain way so to make the response to these events
easier.
4 Conclusions
This paper explores a speciﬁc mechanism to explain diﬀerences in political institutions, which have
been identiﬁed as one of the main determinants of GDP per capita today by an extensive empirical
literature. A theoretical model shows that, when the elite faces a high risk of uprisings from the
rest of the population, and the costs of these conﬂicts are uncertain and asymmetric for members of
the elite, they may ﬁnd it optimal to set lower constraints on the executive even if this is costly for
them due to a higher risk of expropriation or a lower provision of public goods. This is because the
members of the elite face a commitment problem. Ex-ante, when they know there is a probability
of facing a particularly costly conﬂict, they are willing to ﬁnance a larger response to conﬂicts
than ex-post, when the conﬂict has erupted but primarily aﬀected other members of the elite.
Lower constraints on the executive are a commitment device as their ex-post preferences about
28the military response has a lower probability to inﬂuence the actual response. Therefore, together
with the literature on the eﬀect of political institutions on income per capita, this paper provides
a channel to explain the eﬀect of civil conﬂicts on long-run development, a link that seems to be
missing in the related literature.
This paper also presents empirical evidence that is consistent with the main prediction of the
model. In particular, a higher risk of future civil conﬂicts, determined by geographic conditions and
external conditions, is associated with lower constraints imposed on the executive at the moment
of independence in countries that achieved independence after WWII. The estimations also show
that these eﬀects are stronger in countries without access to oil ﬁelds, and when countries face a
risk of minor conﬂicts. These two results are in line with the main prediction of the model since in
these cases the costs of conﬂicts are more likely to be asymmetric and uncertain.
A diﬀerent environment to which the model can be applied is the post independence period in
the Americas. Historians have argued that the risk of uprisings from non-whites in these economies
was important, and some evidence reviewed in the paper suggests that they meet the conditions
required by the theoretical model: they were geographically localized and small-scale conﬂicts that
aﬀected a regionally dispersed elite. The econometric evidence shows that only countries with a
low risk of this type of conﬂict were able to raise the constraints imposed on the executive after
the lost decades following independence, when a process of institutional design could take place at
the same time that new economic sectors started to develop. Moreover the evidence shows that
the countries that did not follow this process had a high risk of rebellions, but also had geographic
conditions that made it more diﬃcult to ﬁght any rebellion, giving additional support to the main
mechanism highlighted in the model.
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Proof of Proposition 1
It is clear that the proposed and accepted tax rates in any period when S =1a r eτ
∗
NWC = 1 and the highest value
consistent with expression (3) for τ
∗
WC. Uniqueness follows directly. If there is no τWC ∈ [0,1] consistent with this
expression then the unique solution to the executive’s maximization problem is τ
∗
WC =0a n dτ
∗
NWC = 1. If there is only
one τWC ∈ [0,1] consistent with the inequality then that tax rate and τ
∗
NWC = 1 is the unique solution. Finally if there
are multiple τWC ∈ [0,1] consistent with it then the unique solution is the maximum of them and τ
∗
NWC =1 . I nt h e
three cases it is clear that we have a unique q
∗.
For the second part deﬁne
LHS(τWC)=
δq(θ − m)







δ(θ − m)(1 − δ(1 − p))
(1 − δ(1 − p)+δq(1 − m))
2










δ(θ − m)(1 − δ(1 − p))




  (λT) −
2Q
 (λT)Q
 (λT)δ(1 − m)
1 − δ(1 − p)+δq(1 − m)

< 0 (10)
Then the LHS of expression (3), (LHS(τWC)), is strictly increasing and strictly concave in τWC. Now deﬁne ¯ θ as
the value of θ for which LHS(1) = 1,
¯ θ =1+
1 − δ(1 − p)
δ

Q(˜ λ) − p

thus ¯ θ only depends on the exogenous parameters δ,p and ˜ λ. Now we deﬁne ¯ m as the value for which LHS(0) = 0,
and so ¯ m solves Q(˜ λ(1 − m)) = p, and we have 0 < ¯ m<1s i n c eQ(˜ λ) >pand Q(0) = 0. This constant ¯ m is only a
function of the exogenous parameters p and ˜ λ.S i n c eT, and thus Q(λT) − p, are continuous, strictly increasing in
τWC, and decreasing in m (strictly decreasing if τWC < 1) it follows that if m<¯ m, q>0 for any τWC and any θ.T h i s
also implies that LHS(0) > 0. Notice that LHS(τWC) is increasing in θ whenever q>0. Therefore if m<¯ m and
θ<¯ θ, LHS(τWC) is increasing in θ and so LHS(1) < 1.
T h e r e f o r ew eh a v et h a ti fm ∈ (0, ¯ m)a n dθ<¯ θ, LHS(0) > 0a n dLHS(1) < 1. This, together with inequalities (9)
and (10) imply that in this case there is a unique value that makes expression (3) to hold with equality, and therefore
this is the unique solution τ
∗
WC to the executive’s maximization problem. We also know that ∂LHS(τ
∗
WC)/∂τWC < 1.
We can then deﬁne H(τWC)=LHS(τWC) − τWC and apply the implicit function theorem to show that the function
τ
∗
WC = τWC(m) is well deﬁned, diﬀerentiable, and that the derivative ∂τ
∗
WC/∂m is a continuous function. The same
follows for q
∗ = q(m) since for this range of parameters q is continuous and strictly increasing in τWC.T op r o v et h a t





1 − δ(1 − p)+δq(1 − m)

˜ λQ
 (λT)(1 − τWC)(θ − τWC − m(1 − τWC)) + q(1 − τWC)

< 0 (11)
Therefore if m ∈ (0, ¯ m)a n dθ<¯ θ, τ
∗
WC is strictly decreasing on m,a n dt h e nT an q are strictly decreasing in it
as well. Finally if θ> ¯ theta LHS(1) > 1 for any m, and so the executive proposes τ
∗
WC = 1, which is always accepted.
This proves the ﬁrst part of the second bullet of the proposition (the last part is proved below).
For the third part, i.e. to show that τ
∗
WC is increasing in θ and λ, and decreasing in p, we need to show ∂H(τWC)/∂θ >






1 − δ(1 − p)+δq(1 − m)




δ(m(1 − τWC) − θ)
1 − δ(1 − p)+δq(1 − m)
< 0
It follows that q




∗ are independent of it.
30It is possible to re-deﬁne the threshold for m. Take ﬁrst m =¯ m,s oLHS(0) = 0. Notice that for values τWC > 0
inequalities (9) and (10) still hold, and LHS(1) < 1i fθ<¯ θ. Then we can have two cases depending on the slope of
LHS(τWC)a tτWC =0w h e nm =¯ m, which is only a function of the exogenous parameters. If this slope is lower than
1, we know there is only one value consistent with expression (3) holding with equality, i.e. τWC = 0. In this case the
threshold deﬁned above is the relevant one, and if m ≥ ¯ m and θ<¯ θ, τ
∗
WC = 0. But if the slope is greater than one then
we have two values consistent with expression (3) holding with equality. In this case the larger one, which is greater
than zero, will be the solution to the executive’s maximization problem. Moreover at this point all the conditions
listed above for the implicit-function theorem hold, and therefore τ
∗
WC is still continuous and strictly decreasing in
m. This happens until there is only one positive tax consistent with expression (3) holding with equality. For this
tax there is a certain value of m which is greater than ¯ m and lower than one. Then we can re-deﬁne the threshold
with this value of m as ˜ m>¯ m and all the results hold. Additionally we know that for all m>˜ m there is no value




Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1 we know that if θ ≥ ¯ θ then τ
∗
WC =1a n dq
∗ = Q(˜ λ)−p>0 for any m. Then the RHS of Equation
(5) is zero, and so m
∗ = 1 follows from the fact that I
 (m) > 0.
To see the case when θ<¯ θ,n o t i c et h a tV (0,0) can be discontinuous at m =¯ m. So ﬁrst assume there is a unique
solution m
∗∗ < ¯ m to equation 5. In this case we have two possible equilibria, m
∗∗ or 1, because 1 is preferred to any
m>¯ m. But there exists a constant ˜ ζ such that if ζ>˜ ζ, m
∗∗ is the unique equilibrium. To see this notice that if
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and so V (0,0;m =1 )− V (0,0;m
∗∗)i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nζ for any m
∗∗. Therefore ˜ ζ is deﬁned as the value that























where the inequality follows from the proof of Proposition 1: if θ<¯ θ and m ∈ (0, ¯ m), ∂τ
∗
WC/∂m > 0. Using the
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Since (12) is ﬁnite and strictly positive, the denominator of the term inside the brackets is strictly positive, and
so the sign of RHS(m) depends on the sign of the numerator inside the square brackets. Call this term num.N o t i c e










(1 − (1 − n)(1/θ − T
∗)+nζ) > 0
Also num is continuous and strictly increasing in ζ.S ot h e r ee x i s t sˆ ζ(m) such that for all ζ>ˆ ζ(m), RHS(m) > 0
(when m<¯ m). Moreover ˆ ζ(m) is decreasing in m, which implies that if ζ>l i m m→0ˆ ζ(m), RHS(m) > 0 for all






























































31where den is the denominator, rev is the ﬁrst term inside the parentheses in the numerator, and tax is the last




∗ are decreasing in m, and because RHS(m) > 0, we have that this term is strictly positive, and so RHS(m)i s
strictly increasing in m when 0 <m<¯ m. Additionally RHS(0) is ﬁnite. Therefore if ζ>¯ ζ = max(limm→0ˆ ζ(m), ˜ ζ)
(implying RHS(¯ m) >I
 (¯ m)), and since I
 (m) > 0, I
 (0) = ∞,a n dI
  (m) < 0, there exists a unique solution
m
∗∗ ∈ (0, ¯ m) to Equation 5, and that solution constitute the unique solution to the legislators’ problem. Finally
deﬁne ζ as the maximum between zero and the value that makes V (0,0;m =1 )−maxm∈(0, ¯ m)(V (0,0;m)) = 0. Thus
if ζ<ζ , m
∗ = 1 for any combination of the rest of the parameters.
Since, for ζ>¯ ζ and θ<¯ θ, m
∗ ∈ (0, ¯ m), and since along that range for m, RHS(m) is strictly increasing on
m,a n dI
 (m) is strictly decreasing on m, we can deﬁne G(m)=I
 (m) − RHS(m), where G(m
∗) = 0, and use the
implicit-value function to prove the last part of the proposition. To do this it is enough to show that, when G(m)=0 ,
∂RHS(m)/∂ζ > 0a n d∂RHS(m)/∂p > 0. Because τ
∗ is independent of ζ, the ﬁrst inequality follows directly from





































+ m − λ
2Q


























∗ are decreasing in p, and because RHS(m) > 0, every term but −RHS(m)m is positive. But
notice that the ﬁrst term, RHS(m)/p, is larger than RHS(m)m,s oRHS(m)/p−RHS(m)m>0, and so the partial
derivative is strictly positive. This proves the last part of the proposition.
QED.
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Indep. XC CC Rainfall RT Fractio− British Oil CC
V ariability nalization Colony
† Reserves (minor)
1 Jordan 1946 0 0 4.32 2.72 0.05 1 0 0
2 Lebanon
1 1946 0.33 0.14 5.26 4.06 0.13 0 0 0.11
3 Syria 1946 0.60 0.08 3.78 1.86 0.22 0 0 0.06
4 Pakistan 1947 0.40 0.21 2.99 3.78 0.64 1 1 0.18
5 Myanmar/Burma 1948 1 0.70 4.98 3.60 0.48 1 1 0.64
6 Sri Lanka 1948 1 0.39 1.67 2.12 0.47 1 0 0.11
7 Israel 1948 1 0.72 4.89 0.99 0.20 0 1 0.72
8 North Korea 1948 0.33 0 2.89 2.26 0.00 0 0 0
9 South Korea 1948 0.30 0 2.99 2.29 0.00 0 0 0
10 Indonesia
2 1949 0.73 0.52 1.92 2.44 0.76 0 1 0.43
11 Taiwan 1949 0.17 0 1.52 3.86 0.27 0 0 0
12 India 1950 1 0.64 3.81 2.63 0.89 1 1 0.63
13 Libya 1951 0.33 0 4.55 1.95 0.22 0 0 0
14 Cambodia
3 1953 0 0.54 3.47 0.69 0.30 0 0 0.39
15 Laos
4 1954 0.67 0.2 4.33 3.61 0.60 0 0 0.04
16 Morocco 1956 0.17 0.30 4.47 3.85 0.53 0 0 0.30
17 Sudan 1956 0.40 0.66 4.28 2.01 0.74 1 0 0.30
18 Malaysia 1957 1 0.10 1.08 2.75 0.65 1 1 0.10
19 Guinea 1958 0 0.04 3.92 1.44 0.75 0 0 0.04
20 Tunisia 1959 0 0.02 2.79 1.34 0.16 0 0 0.02
21 Singapore
5 1959 1 0 0.41 0 0.42 0 0 0
22 Benin
6 1960 0.27 0 3.27 0 0.62 0 0 0
23 Burkina Faso 1960 0.33 0.02 5.63 0 0.68 0 0 0.02
24 Cameroon 1960 0.33 0.02 2.51 2.93 0.89 0 0 0.02
25 C.A.R. 1960 0 0.10 3.63 1.69 0.69 0 0 0.10
26 Chad 1960 0 0.69 5.77 2.25 0.83 0 0 0.59
27 Congo (Braz) 1960 0.43 0.12 5.68 0 0.66 0 1 0.10
28 Ivory Coast 1960 0 0.06 2.47 0.34 0.86 0 0 0.06
29 Gabon 1960 0.17 0 4.54 0.07 0.69 0 1 0
30 Ghana 1960 0 0.06 2.41 0 0.71 1 0 0.06
31 Madagascar 1960 0.33 0.02 3.51 3.52 0.06 0 0 0.02
32 Mali 1960 0.33 0.08 5.86 0.34 0.78 0 0 0.08
33 Mauritania 1960 0.47 0.08 4.65 0 0.34 0 0 0.08
34 Niger 1960 0.33 0.14 5.24 1.13 0.73 0 0 0.14
35 Nigeria 1960 1 0.12 2.88 1.22 0.87 1 1 0.04
36 Senegal
7 1960 0.33 0.18 5.54 0 0.72 0 0 0.18
37 Somalia 1960 1 0.41 4.58 2.61 0.08 1 0 0.31
38 Togo 1960 0.33 0.04 2.41 0 0.71 0 0 0.04
39 Zaire/Congo
8 1960 0 0.27 4.02 1.65 0.90 0 0 0.20
40 Rwanda 1961 0 0.23 3.14 4.31 0.13 0 0 0.15
41 Sierra Leone 1961 0.67 0.21 5.42 0.99 0.77 1 0 0.21
42 Tanzania 1961 0.33 0 5.03 3.12 0.93 1 0 0
43 Algeria 1962 0.10 0.38 4.93 2.82 0.44 0 1 0.23
44 Burundi
9 1962 0.30 0.36 3.04 4.32 0.04 0 0 0.36
45 Uganda
10 1962 0.93 0.68 1.32 2.34 0.90 1 0 0.55
46 Jamaica 1962 1 0 2.43 1.34 0.05 1 0 0
47 Trinidad 1962 1 0.02 1.77 0 0.56 1 1 0.02
48 Kenya 1963 0.60 0.02 2.58 3.31 0.83 1 0 0.02
49 Kuwait 1963 0.23 0 3.37 0 0.18 1 1 0
50 Malawi 1964 0 0 5.39 2.28 0.62 1 0 0
33Indep. XC CC Rainfall RT Fractio− British Oil CC
V ariability nalization Colony
† Reserves (minor)
51 Zambia 1964 0.30 0 5.45 0.18 0.82 1 0 0
52 Gambia 1965 0.67 0.02 6.22 0 0.73 1 0 0.02
53 Botswana 1966 0.67 0 4.68 0 0.51 1 0 0
54 Lesotho 1966 0.80 0.02 2.32 4.42 0.22 1 0 0.02
55 South Yemen 1967 0.33 0.02 3.18 3.34 0.17 0 0 0
56 Mauritius 1968 1 0 3.04 0 0.58 1 0 0
57 Swaziland 1968 0.17 0 2.50 2.79 0.39 1 0 0
58 Bahrain 1971 0.13 0 2.94 0 0.26 0 1 0
59 Qatar*
11 1971 0 0 3.61 0 1 1 0
60 U.A.R. 1971 0.33 0 3.61 0 0.18 1 1 0
61 Bangladesh 1972 0.47 0.49 4.98 0 0.00 0 0 0.49
62 Guinea Bissau 1974 0.33 0.06 5.54 0 0.80 0 0 0.06
63 Comoros* 1975 0.40 0.06 1.71 0 0 0.06
64 Angola 1975 0.33 0.88 4.77 2.37 0.78 0 1 0.32
65 Mozambique 1975 0.17 0.47 2.24 1.22 0.65 0 0 0.15
66 Vietnam 1976 0.33 0 2.90 3.01 0.27 0 0 0
67 Djibouti 1977 0.17 0.16 3.26 1.59 0.69 0 0 0.16
68 Zimbabwe 1980 0.60 0 5.28 1.36 0.54 1 0 0
69 Namibia 1990 0.67 0 4.38 2.48 0.68 0 0 0
70 Yemen
12 1990 0.17 0.05 3.18 3.34 0.06 0 1 0
71 Croatia 1991 0.33 0.17 0.72 1.53 0.33 0 1 0.17
72 Armenia 1991 0.60 0 1.79 2.81 0.12 0 0 0
73 Azerbaijan 1991 0.30 0.28 1.79 3.28 0.30 0 1 0.11
74 Belarus 1991 0.87 0 0.88 0 0.40 0 0 0
75 Estonia 1991 1 0 0.69 0 0.52 0 0 0
76 Georgia 1991 0.67 0.28 1.56 4.12 0.50 0 0 0.28
77 Kazakhstan 1991 0.30 0 0.98 4.00 0.69 0 1 0
78 Kyrgyzstan 1991 0.50 0 1.46 4.05 0.66 0 0 0
79 Latvia 1991 1 0 0.69 0 0.61 0 0 0
80 Lithuania 1991 1 0 0.69 0 0.35 0 0 0
81 Macedonia* 1991 0.67 0.06 0.63 2.24 0 0.06
82 Moldova 1991 0.87 0.06 1.09 0 0.55 0 0 0.06
83 Slovenia* 1991 1 0 0.72 2.34 0 0
84 Tajikistan 1991 0.33 0.33 2.82 4.41 0.55 0 0 0.22
85 Turkmenistan 1991 0.03 0 1.39 2.56 0.46 0 0 0
86 Ukraine 1991 0.73 0 1.09 1.74 0.42 0 0 0
87 Uzbekistan 1991 0 0.17 1.39 3.09 0.48 0 1 0.17
88 Czech Republic 1993 1 0 1.29 1.15 0.32 0 1 0
89 Eritrea* 1993 0.33 0.19 3.18 2.48 0 0.19
90 Slovakia 1993 0.83 0 1.15 2.14 0.25 0 1 0
91 South Africa 1994 1 0 2.30 2.16 0.88 0 1 0
92 Serbia Montenegro*
13 2003 0.13 0 0.72 2.67 0 0
Notes: * Countries only included in the regressions without additional control variables.
† British colony at the time
of independence.
1 Independence recognized by France in 1943, but the region was under allied control until the
end of WWII.
2 Independence proclaimed in 1945, but recognized by the Netherlands in 1949.
3 First two years of
XC are coded as transition. The average is taken for 1955-1957.
4 First four years of XC coded as transition. The
average is taken for 1958-1959.
5 Fourth year of XC coded as missing. The average is for 1959-1962.
6 Fourth and
ﬁfth years of XC coded as transition. The average is taken for 1960-1965 with linear interpolation.
7 Third year of
XC coded as transition. The value for that year is interpolated.
8 First year with valid XC is 1966. That value is
used, which is the minimum possible.
9 Fourth year of XC coded as transition. Interpolation is used.
10 Fifth year of
XC coded as transition. Interpolation is used.
11 RT is not reported by previous papers, but the territory is mostly
ﬂ a ts oav a l u eo fz e r oi su s e d .
12 First three years of XC coded as transition. Average is taken for 1993-1994.
13 The
value of RT is the one reported for Yugoslavia in previous papers.
34References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2001): “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Develop-
ment: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91, 1369–1401.
(2002): “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World
Income Distribution,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1231–1244.
Acemoglu, D., and J. A. Robinson (2000): “Why did the West extend the Franchise? Democracy,
inequality, and growth in historical perspective,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1167–1199.
(2006): Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge.
Baron, D. P., and J. A. Ferejohn (1989): “Bargaining in Legislatures,” American Political Science
Review, 83(4), 1181–1206.
Bates, R. H., J. H. Coatsworth, and J. G. Williamson (2007): “Lost Decades: Postindependence
Performance in Latin America and Africa,” The Journal of Economic History, 67(4), 917–943.
Besley, T. J., and T. Persson (2010): “State Capacity, Conﬂict, and Development,” Econometrica,
126(3), 1411–1445.
(2011): “The Logic of Political Violence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78(1), 1–34.
Blattman, C., and E. Miguel (2010): “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 3–57.
Bruckner, M., and A. Ciccone (2011): “Rain and The Democratic Window of Opportunity,” Econo-
metrica, 79(3), 923–947.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., and A. Smith (2009): “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional
Change,” Comparative Political Studies, 42(2), 167–197.
Buhaug, H., and S. Gates (2002): “The Geography of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research, 39(4),
417–433.
Coatsworth, J. H. (1988): “Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Latin America: Mexico in Comparative
Perspective,” in Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conﬂict in Mexico, ed. by F. Katz, pp.
21–62. Princeton University Press.
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler (2004): “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers,
56(4), 563–595.
(2007): “Civil War,” Handbook of Defense Economics, 2, 711–739.
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and D. Rohner (2009): “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil
War,” Oxford Economic Papers, 61(1), 1–27.
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and M. Soderbom (2008): “Post-Conﬂict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research,
45(4), 461–478.
Collier, P., and D. Rohner (2008): “Democracy, Development, and Conﬂict,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 6(2-3), 531–540.
Collier, S., and W. F. Sater (2004): A History of Chile, 1808-2002. Cambridge University Press, 2nd
edn.
35Colomer, J. M. (2004): “Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instability in Latin America,”
Latin American Politics and Society, 46(2), 29–58.
Drake, P. W. (2009): Between Tyranny and Anarchy: A History of Democracy in Latin America, 1800-
2006. Stanford University Press.
Eakin, M. C. (2007): The History of Latin America: Collision of Cultures. Palgrave Macmillan.
Engerman, S., and K. Sokoloff (1997): “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Diﬀerential Paths of
Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in How
Latin America Fell Behind, ed. by S. Haber, pp. 206–304. Stanford University Press.
(2002): “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies,”
Economia, (Fall), 41–109.
Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin (2003): “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political
Science Review, 97(1), 75–90.
Garc´ ıa-Jimeno, C., and J. A. Robinson (2011): “The Myth of the Frontier,” in Understanding Long-Run
Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Kenneth L. Sokoloﬀ, ed. by D. L. Costa, and N. R. Lamoreaux.
University of Chicago Press.
Gargarella, R. (2004): “Towards a Typology of Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-60,” Latin
American Research Review, 39(2), 141–153.
Glasser, E., and A. Schleifer (2002): “Legal Origins,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1193–1229.
Harbom, L., E. Melander, and P. Wallensteen (2008): “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conﬂict,
1946-2007,” Journal of Peace Research, 45(5), 697–710.
Hegre, H., and N. Sambanis (2006): “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,”
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 50(4), 508–535.
Horowitz, D. L. (2002): “Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes,” in The Architecture of
Democracy, ed. by A. Reynolds. Oxford University Press.
Humphreys, M. (2005): “Natural Resources, Conﬂict, and Conﬂict Resolution,” Journal of Conﬂict Reso-
lution, 49(4), 508–537.
Kalyvas, S. N. (2007): “Civil Wars,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. by C. Boix,
and S. C.Stokes, chap. 18, pp. 416–434. Oxford University Press.
Katz, F. (1988): “Rural Rebellions after 1810,” in Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conﬂict
in Mexico, ed. by F. Katz, pp. 521–560. Princeton University Press.
Kim, S. (2009): “Institutions and US Regional Development: A Study of Massachusetts and Virginia,”
Journal of Institutional Economics, 5(2), 181–205.
Lijphart, A. (1995): “Multiethnic Democracies,” in The Encyclopedia of Democracy, ed. by S. M. Lipset.
Congressional Quarterly Books.
Loevman, B. (1993): The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America.U n i v e r s i t y
of Pittsburgh Press.
Mahoney, J. (2003): “Long-Run Development and the Legacy of Colonialism in Spanish America,” Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 109(1), 50–106.
36Maier, P. (2010): Ratiﬁcation: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788. Simon & Scuster.
Marshall, M. G., and K. Jaggers (2007): POLITY IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual.P o l i t yI V
Project, Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University, and Center for
Systemic Peace.
McEvedy, C., and R. Jones (1978): Atlas of World Population History. Facts on File, New York.
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004): “Economic Shocks and Civil Conﬂicts: An Instru-
mental Variable Approach,” Journal of Political Economy.
Moreira, M. (2003): “A Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test for Structural Models,” Econometrica, 71(4),
1027–1048.
Nel, P., and M. Righarts (2008): “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conﬂict,” International
Studies Quarterly, 52, 159–185.
North, D., J. Wallis, and B. Weingast (2009): Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge.
Nunn, N. (2008): “Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An Examination of
the Engerman-Sokoloﬀ Hypothesis,” in Institutions and Economic Performance, ed. by E. Helpman, pp.
148–180. Harvard University Press.
P a r k e r ,P .M .(1997): National Cultures of the World: A Statistical Reference. Greenwood Press.
Ray, D. (2010): “Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 24(3), 45–60.
Smith, T. (1987): “A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 20(1), 70–102.
Stock, J., and M. Yogo (2005): “Testing for Weak Instruments in IV Regression,” in Identiﬁcation and
Inference for Econometric Models: A Festschrift in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg, ed. by D. Andrews, and
J. Stock, pp. 80–108. Cambridge University Press.
Thach, Jr, C. C. (1969): The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History.
The John Hopkins Press.
Tilly, C. (1992): The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History. Blackwell
Publishing.
W i a r d a ,H .J .(2005): Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin America. Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers.
Williamson, E. (2009): The Penguin History of Latin America. Penguin Books.
Wooldbridge, J. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press.
37 
Documentos de Trabajo 
Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers 
Central Bank of Chile 
  
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES PAST ISSUES 
 
La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:   
www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con un 
costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por fax: 
(56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually for 
US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231 
or e-mail: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
 
DTBC – 648 
Propagation of Shocks to Food and Energy prices: an 
International Comparison 
Michael Pedersen  
Diciembre 2011 
   
DTBC – 647 
Incertidumbre Global Sobre la Economía Chile  
Yan Carrière–Swallow y Carlos Medel 
Noviembre 2011 
   
DTBC – 646  
The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks in Emerging Economies  
Yan Carrière–Swallow y Luis Felipe Céspedes 
Noviembre 2011 
   
DTBC – 645 
Crédito, Exceso de Toma de Riesgo, Costo de Crédito y Ciclo 
Económico en Chile 
Carlos J. García y Andrés Sagner 
Septiembre 2011 
   
DTBC – 644 
Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Limited 
Commitment  
Septiembre 2011 
Sofia Bauducco y Francesco Caprioli   
DTBC – 643  





 DTBC – 642 
Dinámica de Precios en Chile: Evidencia con datos de 
Supermercados  





DTBC – 641 
A Reassessment of Flexible Price Evidence Using Scanner Data: 
Evidence from an Emerging Economy  
Gastón Chaumont, Miguel Fuentes, Felipe Labbé y Alberto Naudon 
Agosto 2011 
   
DTBC – 640  
Copper, the Real Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
in Chile 
José De Gregorio y Felipe Labbé 
Agosto 2011 
   
DTBC – 639 
Credit Contraction and International Trade: Evidence From 
Chilean Exporters 
Ari Aisen, Roberto Álvarez, Andrés Sagner y Javier Turén 
Agosto 2011 
   
DTBC – 638  
Investment Dynamics in a DSGE Model With Heterogeneous 
Firms and Corporate Taxation  
Sergio Salgado I. 
Agosto 2011 
   
DTBC – 637  
Labor Market Dynamics in Chile: the Role of Terms of Trade 
Shocks 
Juan Pablo Medina y Alberto Naudon 
Agosto 2011 
   
DTBC – 636 
Distribución de la Riqueza, Capital Social y Tasa de Crecimiento 
Pablo Filippi 
Agosto 2011 
   
DTBC – 635  
Time – Consistent Bailout Plans  
Ernest Pastén 
Julio 2011 
   
DTBC – 634 
Proyecciones de Inflación con Precios de Frecuencia Mixta: el 
Caso Chileno 
Juan Sebastián Becerra y Carlos Saavedra  
Julio 2011 